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FLORIDA IMPACT DOCTRINE: NO LONGER AN
OBSTACLE TO RECOVERY OF EMOTIONAL
DAMAGES IN WRONGFUL BIRTH
Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1992)
Thomas W. Ledman*

Respondents, a set of parents, filed a medical malpractice suit against
petitioners' alleging wrongful birth of the parents' child,2 who was born
severely deformed and mentally retarded.3 Petitioners, the parents' health
care providers, tested the parents for inheritable genetic abnormalities prior
to conception of the child, and reported negative results.4 Genetic tests
performed subsequent to the child's birth, however, revealed that the child
suffered from a genetic abnormality inherited from the mother.' Had the
health care providers properly communicated this information to the parents before conception, the parents could have opted not to have the
child.6 The parents asserted a claim for wrongful birth and sought damages for mental anguish.7 The trial court struck the parents' claim for emo-

* Dedicated to my wife, Sealy and our son, Jase. You are my inspiration.
1. Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So. 2d 415, 417 (Fla. 1992). Petitioners included: Pedro A. Diaz, M.D.,
respondents' pediatrician who referred respondents for genetic testing; Arthur A. Maislen, M.D., the
physician who coordinated the testing; the North Broward Hospital District; and Arthur W. Kush,
M.D., respondents' physician during the four years preceding the lawsuit. Id. at 417-18. The court held
that claims against all petitioners except Dr. Kush were barred by the four-year statute of repose. Id. at
418. For further discussion regarding the statute of repose, see infra note 12.
2. Kush, 616 So. 2d at 417. The child was the parents' second child. Id. He was born with
genetic abnormalities identical to abnormalities suffered by the parents' first child. Id. The parents
were genetically tested following the birth of their first child to ascertain whether the child's congenital defect was the result of an inherent genetic abnormality in one of the parents. Id. For undetermined
reasons, the testing physician never revealed to the parents' pediatrician the positive results of one test.
Id. As a result, the pediatrician informed the parents that their first child's impairment was an accident
of nature and that they could have another child without incident. Id.
3. Lloyd v. North Broward Hosp. Dist., 570 So. 2d 984, 985 (3d DCA 1990), modifled, Kush v.
Lloyd, 616 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1992). Genetic tests performed subsequent to the second child's birth
revealed that both children suffered from an identical genetic abnormality inherited from the mother-10p trisomy. Kush, 616 So. 2d at 417.
4. Kush, 616 So. 2d at 417. The court also found that the results of the earlier test, which were
never provided to the parents, would have revealed the abnormality. Id.
5. Id.
6. See id.
7. Id. Respondents also asserted a claim for wrongful life and sought recovery for the extraordinary expenses associated with the second child's medical condition. Id. The court refused to recognize
the tort of wrongful life in Florida. Id. at 417 n.3, 423. The court did, however, recognize the parents'
claim for the extraordinary upbringing costs of the child, even beyond the age of majority. Id. at 42324. Previously, the court had recognized the extraordinary upbringing expenses in raising a deformed
child to majority, but expressly declined to address under what circumstances such damages may be
349
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tional damages, finding that claims for mental anguish were not cognizable in a wrongful birth action.' On appeal, the Third District Court of
Appeal found that the parents had stated a valid claim because mental
anguish is a natural consequence of the wrongful birth tort, which is recoverable whether or not a direct physical impact occurs.9 The Florida
Supreme Court granted review,"0 affirmed, and HELD, the impact
doctrine, which often precludes the recovery of emotional damages for
negligence" does not apply in the context of wrongful birth claims. 2
The tort of wrongful birth is relatively new in Florida.'3 The defendants in such cases are typically health care providers charged with negligence either in failing to prevent the conception or birth of a child 4 or in
failing to adequately diagnose or inform parents that a child might be born
recoverable beyond the age of majority. Fassoulas v. Ramey, 450 So. 2d 822, 823 (Fla. 1984).
8. Lloyd, 570 So. 2d at 986.
9. Kush, 616 So. 2d at 418.
10. Id. at 417. The Florida Supreme Court had jurisdiction pursuant to FLA. CONST. art. V, §
3(b)(3), (4) (granting the Florida Supreme Court discretionary jurisdiction to decide questions of great
public importance certified to it by district courts of appeal and to resolve conflicting district court
decisions). The district court certified a question of great public importance regarding the four-year
statute of repose. Kush, 616 So. 2d at 417; see infra note 12. The district court also certified conflict
with Moores v. Lucas, 405 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) (denying recovery for emotional pain
and suffering in a wrongful birth case). Kush, 616 So. 2d at 417.
11. The Impact Doctrine is a judicially-created doctrine which precludes the recovery of emotional damages in negligence unless the emotional damages are a direct consequence of a physical
impact or injury inflicted upon the claimant by the negligent party. See infra text accompanying notes
26-32.
12. Kush, 616 So. 2d at 423. However, the primary issue certified to the supreme court was
whether the four-year statute of repose extinguished the cause of action for wrongful birth because the
child was born more than four years after the negligent diagnosis. Id. at 417; see FLA. STAT. §
95.1 l(4)(b) (1985). In a separate part of the opinion, the court held that the medical malpractice statute
of repose barred recovery against all petitioners except Dr. Kush. Kush, 616 So. 2d at 418-22. The
court interpreted the statute to run from the date the negligent advice was given, not from the date of
birth of the child. Id. at 418. The court reasoned that in enacting the statute of repose, the legislature
determined "that there must be an outer limit beyond which medical malpractice suits may not be
instituted." Id. at 421.
13. The first Florida case to recognize a cause of action for wrongful birth was Jackson v. Anderson, 230 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970). Cases dealing with wrongful birth generally fall into two
categories: (1) those arising from failed sterilization or abortion (These are technically "wrongful conception" or "wrongful pregnancy" cases rather than wrongful birth.), see infra note 14, and (2) those
arising from the failure to diagnose or warn of an inheritable disease or genetic defect (These cases are
called "eugenic wrongful birth" cases.). See Moores v. Lucas, 405 So. 2d 1022, 1026 (5th DCA 1981),
overruled by Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1992). The instant case addresses a claim for eugenic wrongful birth. Kush, 616 So. 2d at 417.
14. Other jurisdictions have distinguished wrongful birth from wrongful conception and wrongful
pregnancy. Kush, 616 So. 2d at 417 n.2. Wrongful conception is a claim for injuries caused by a negligently performed sterilization or contraception procedure which results in pregnancy. Id. Wrongful
pregnancy is a claim for a negligently performed abortion procedure. Id. Florida courts encompass
wrongful conception within a claim for wrongful birth. See, e.g., Fassoulas,450 So. 2d at 823; Public
Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So. 2d 1084, 1085 (3d DCA 1980), petition for rev. denied, 399 So. 2d
1140 (Fla. 1981); Jackson, 230 So. 2d at 503.
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with a genetic defect or deformity." These latter cases are referred to as
"eugenic" wrongful births. 6 In such cases, the parents essentially claim
that the health care provider's failure to disclose eugenic information cost
the parents the opportunity to prevent the birth of a genetically defective
child.' 7
The first Florida case to recognize a cause of action for eugenic
wrongful birth was Moores v. Lucas."5 The parents in Moores filed suit
against various physicians alleging, inter alia, that the physicians negligently failed to inform them that the mother's known genetic malady was
inheritable. 9 Consequently, the mother gave birth to a child with the
same genetic ailment.2" If the physicians had informed the parents, the
parents would not have had a child.2' Although the Moores court allowed
a claim for economic damages, it denied recovery of damages for emotional pain and suffering.' The court based its decision on the impact
doctrine" without discussing the doctrine's applicability or possible limitations in this new area of tort law.24
The judicially created impact doctrine was first adopted by the Florida Supreme Court in International Ocean Telegraph Co. v. Saunders.26
The respondent in Saunders sued the petitioner for negligently failing to
deliver a telegram message promptly; the telegram stated that respondent's
wife was dying.27 The respondent asserted that he suffered great mental
anguish because he could not be with his wife in her dying hours and was
unable to make preparations for her funeral.' In reversing the trial court,
the Florida Supreme Court held that mental suffering was not a recoverable element of damages in ordinary negligence except where the mental
15. W.
ed. 1984).

PAGE KEETON ET AL.. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 55, at 370 (5th

16. Kristin Hackett, Note, The FragileX Omen: Scientific Advances Compel a Legislative Treatment of Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth, 2 J.L. & TECH. 249, 252 (1987).

17. KEETON Er AL., supra note 15. The rise of this tort was propelled primarily by two interrelated factors. The first was the change in public policy characterized by the growing acceptance of the
concept of eugenic abortions which followed the United States Supreme Court decision in Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See Arche v. United States, 798 P.2d 477, 480 (Kan. 1990). The second
was the rapid response of the medical community in developing prenatal diagnostic procedures to
detect inheritable genetic defects in parents and in fetuses. Id.
18. 405 So. 2d 1022, 1026 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).
19. Id. at 1024.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1026.
Id.; see supra note 11.

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Moores, 405 So. 2d at 1026.
Gilliam v. Stewart, 291 So. 2d 593, 595 (Fla. 1974).
14 So. 148 (Fla. 1893).
Id.
Id. at 149.
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suffering was "incident to, connected with, and flowing directly from [a]
physical injury."'29 The court reasoned that mental suffering "soars so exclusively within the realms of spirit land that it is beyond the reach of the
courts to deal with, or to compensate by any of the known standards of
value."3 The court stated that it would be highly appropriate for the legislature to define a standard of recovery. 3 Until the legislature established such a standard, the court was unwilling to "diverge from the circumscribed limits of judicial action."32
For the next eighty years, Florida courts adhered to the impact doctrine, precluding recovery for emotional or psychic injuries caused by a
defendant's negligence in the absence of physical impact to the claimant.33 Courts asserted several primary policy arguments for adhering to
this position.' One argument was a perceived difficulty in proving a
causal connection between the negligent act and the psychic injury.35 Another was a fear of spurious, fraudulent, or exaggerated claims. 36 A third
policy argument was the belief that abrogation of the impact doctrine
could result in a flood of litigation.37
In Stewart v. Gilliam, the Fourth District Court of Appeal attempted to
reject the direct impact rule as an archaic doctrine at variance with modem-day concepts of justice.3 ' The Florida Supreme Court, however, reversed the decision and admonished the district court of appeal for unjustifiably receding from a long-standing position of the supreme court. 39 The
Florida Supreme Court reiterated that emotional damages would not be
recoverable "in the absence of wantonness, willfulness or malice" unless
accompanied by physical impact. 4

29. Id. at 151.
30. Id. at 152.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., Clark v. Choctawhatchee Elec. Coop., 107 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 1958) (reaffirming the
impact doctrine, but awarding the plaintiff emotional damages arising from an electric shock only
because the shock was found to be a physical impact); Crane v. Loftin, 70 So. 2d 574, 576 (Fla. 1954)
(holding that absent a showing of malice or willful and wanton negligence, plaintiff could not "recover
damages for personal injuries resulting from fright and mental anguish unaccompanied by direct physical impact or trauma"); Dunahoo v. Bess, 200 So. 541 (Fla. 1941) (denying recovery for mental anguish which resulted from the careless and negligent handling of a corpse when unconnected with
physical injury).
34. Stewart v. Gilliam, 271 So. 2d 466, 472 (4th DCA 1972), rev'd, 291 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1974).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. 271 So. 2d 466, 472 (4th DCA 1972), rev'd, 291 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1974). Here, the plaintiff
suffered physical injury-a heart attack-as a result of emotional distress, but suffered no physical injury as a result of a direct impact. Id. at 468.
39. Gilliam v. Stewart, 291 So. 2d 593, 594-95 (Fla. 1974).
40. Id. at 594 (quoting Stewart, 271 So. 2d at 469).
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The Florida Supreme Court demonstrated its first willingness to modify or restrict the impact doctrine's application in Champion v. Gray.4 In
Champion, the mother of a girl who was struck and killed by a drunk
driver heard the impact of the collision and immediately went to the accident scene.42 Overcome with shock and grief upon seeing her daughter's
body, the mother collapsed and died on the spot.43 Without abrogating

the rule, the court carved a limited exception for significant physical manifestations of psychic harm.'

The court reasoned that physical impact

should not be a prerequisite to a cause of action for psychic trauma where
the trauma caused death or significant physical injury.45 The court limited

this exception to psychic trauma resulting from an injury negligently inflicted upon a close family member' within the sensory perception of the
psychologically traumatized person.47 The court, however, did not clearly
define the outer limits of this exception to the general rule.48
The Champion court, in effect, adopted a limited standard of foreseeability.49 The court stated that the public policy of Florida would not
permit a pure foreseeability test which would expand recovery to purely
subjective and speculative damages for psychic trauma alone.50 The court
opined that a limitation was necessary to minimize the potential of fraudu-

41. 478 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1985).
42. Id. at 18.
43. Id.
44. Id.; see also Brown v. Cadillac Motor Car Div., 468 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 1985). In Brown, a
collateral opinion issued the same day, the court denied recovery to a man who suffered emotional
distress after a faulty automobile accelerator pedal caused him to run over and kill his mother. Brown.
468 So. 2d at 904. In stressing the limits of the Champion decision, the court denied recovery because
petitioner's psychic trauma was not manifested by physical injury. Id. Thus, the court reaffirmed that
the impact doctrine precluded recovery for psychic trauma alone. Id.
45. Champion, 478 So. 2d at 19.
46. Id. at 18. The court stated that a close emotional attachment might suffice depending on the
relationship between the parties and the circumstances. Id. at 20. Courts have found that a boyfriend/girlfriend relationship does not meet this standard. See Reynolds v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 611 So. 2d 1294 (4th DCA 1992), rev. denied, 623 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 1993); Ferretti v. Weber, 513
So. 2d 1333 (4th DCA), dismissed, 519 So. 2d 986 (Fla. 1987).
47. Champion, 478 So. 2d at 18-19. The court, in effect, adopted a limited standard of foreseeability for certain psychic damages flowing from a negligent injury imposed on persons who had a
close personal relationship with the claimant. Id. at 20. The court listed three requirements which
define this limited foreseeability: (1) the claimant must display a significant discernible physical injury
caused by psychic trauma; (2) the psychically injured party should be "directly involved" in the event
causing the original injury ("If such a person sees it, hears it, or arrives upon the scene while the injured party is still there, that person is likely involved."); and (3) the psychically injured party must
have an especially close emotional attachment to the directly injured person. Id. This guideline is a
modification of the test established in the landmark case, Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 920 (Cal.
1968).
48. Champion, 478 So. 2d at 21 (Alderman, J., concurring specially).
49. Id. at 20.
50. Id.
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lent claims, and to place some boundaries on nebulous psychic claims."
In the instant case, the Florida Supreme Court established an additional exception to the impact doctrine52 which may have expanded the outer
limits of recovery for psychic trauma. 3 In overruling Moores on the issue
of emotional damages for psychic trauma, 4 the instant court questioned
whether the impact doctrine should be applied to a tort such as wrongful
birth.5 The court reasoned that the impact doctrine might not apply to
preclude recovery because the respondents had an independent claim in
wrongful birth56 and because emotional distress is a natural "parasitic"
consequence of that tort.57
Additionally, the instant court compared wrongful birth to other recognized torts in which damages are predominantly emotional, such as negligent defamation or invasion of privacy." The court reasoned that if emotional damages are ascertainable in those contexts, they are equally ascertainable in the context of wrongful birth. 9 Moreover, the court reasoned
that psychic trauma is more likely to occur when negligent medical advice
leads parents to give birth to a deformed or diseased child than when one
negligently defames or invades the privacy of another. 6' Thus, the instant
court concluded that public policy required that the impact doctrine not be
applied to preclude recovery of emotional damages in wrongful birth
claims.6'
The instant case went beyond Champion in recognizing a cause of
action by awarding psychic damages without any physical manifestation of
the psychic trauma.62 However, it is not clear whether the court's decision reflected a change in its position regarding the historical policy argu-

51. Id.
52. Kush, 616 So. 2d at 423.
53. Id. at 423 n.5.
54. Id. at n.6.
55. Id. at 424. The impact rule applies where the defendant's negligence causes only emotional
distress without an accompanying physical injury or some other independent basis for tort liability. Id.
(citing KEETON E'r AL., supra note 15, § 54, at 361-65).
56. Id. Florida courts had recognized a wrongful birth cause of action prior to this decision. See,
e.g., Fassoulas v. Ramey, 450 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1984); Moores, 405 So. 2d at 1026; Public Health
Trust v. Brown, 388 So. 2d 1084 (3d DCA 1980), pet. for rev. denied, 399 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 1981);
Jackson v. Anderson, 230 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970). However, prior to this decision, courts
limited damages in wrongful birth to extraordinary economic expenses; specifically, courts would
award damages only for those expenses which exceeded the costs of raising a healthy child. See
Fassoulas,450 So. 2d at 824.
57. Kush, 616 So. 2d at 422.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See id.
62. See id.
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ments supporting the impact doctrine or whether the court simply established another limited exception to the general rule.63 If the instant court
based its conclusion on the notion that emotional damages are a natural
consequence of wrongful birth actions, the impact of this case may be
limited to eugenic wrongful birth claims.' If, however, this result was
outcome driven, it may be indicative of the court's weakening support for
the impact doctrine. Under the latter scenario, this decision may provide a
precedent for additional exceptions or for an alternative rule.6'
If the court simply intended to exclude wrongful birth claims from the
impact doctrine, it seems the court could have accepted the finding of the

district court of appeal that there was in fact a direct impact.' Under this
theory, other courts have found that a health care provider's failure to provide adequate or accurate genetic testing information to the parents was a
direct injury.67 These courts have found that the injury is not the birth of
a deformed child, but rather the denial of the parents' fundamental right to
make a private choice regarding procreation.69
Using the district court's reasoning, the Florida Supreme Court could

63. See id.

64. Although this decision may be limited to eugenic wrongful births, it will not necessarily have
a minimal impact on the individuals affected. This decision may very well "send a shiver through the
medical community and those seeking medical care." Kush, 616 So. 2d at 425 (McDonald, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
65. The court may be well advised to consider the approach taken by the Virginia Supreme
Court. See Naccash v. Burger, 290 S.E.2d 825, 830 (Va. 1982). Virginia allows plaintiffs to recover
emotional damages absent a showing of physical impact if the plaintiff can establish an unbroken
chain of causal connection between the negligent act and the emotional damages. Id. at 831. The plaintiff must prove the causal connection with clear and convincing evidence. Id. A heavier burden of
proof, such as clear and convincing evidence, aids in filtering out tenuous claims while still allowing
recovery for those who suffer legitimate psychic trauma.
66. Lloyd v. North Broward Hosp. Dist., 570 So. 2d 984, 988 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). The supreme
court did not find it necessary to address this argument in the instant case. Kush, 616 So. 2d at 423
n.6.
67. See, e.g., Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 14-15 (N.J. 1979) (indicating that emotional distress
may be just as "real" as physical pain); Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 322 S.E.2d 567, 573 (N.C. 1984),
modified, 337 S.E.2d 528 (N.C. 1985), cert. denied,479 U.S. 835 (1986); Naccash, 290 S.E.2d at 82930.
68. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (recognizing procreation and privacy as
fundamental rights).
69. Azzolino, 322 S.E.2d at 573 (holding that the essence of the parents' claim in wrongful birth
is the right to make an informed decision about whether to conceive or abort a child). This position
becomes clear when we consider that the information may be used for reasons other than to decide
whether or not to terminate the pregnancy. Parents who opt not to abort may still use the information
to prepare themselves for the emotional and economical burdens of raising a "special-needs" child.
Additionally, advance warning may enable the parents to have the fetus treated in utero and thereby
mitigate or eliminate the defect. See Kristin Hackett, Note, The FragileX Omen: Scientific Advances
Compel a Legislative Treatment of Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth, 2 J.L. & TECH. 249, 252

(1987).
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easily have found a direct impact and left the rule intact.7" Alternatively,
the instant court simply could have held that emotional damages were a
natural consequence of wrongful birth without further discussion. However, the instant court chose to render its decision on public policy
grounds.7' This alternative choice buttresses the proposition that the
court's support for the impact doctrine may be weakening.
It is ironic that public policy considerations drove the instant court, as
public policy had always leaned in favor of applying the impact doctrine.72 Fear of spurious claims, the inability to adequately assess psychic
damages, perceived problems of causation, and a desire to avoid excessive
litigation have all contributed to the longevity of the impact doctrine in
Florida.73 In addition, an underlying policy argument supporting the impact doctrine has been the belief that not every injury should be compensable-that people should absorb some harms without remuneration as the
price for living in an organized society.74
The court did not articulate which of the above historical policy arguments no longer supported strict adherence to the impact doctrine. Perhaps Naccash v. Burger, a Virginia case with a factual situation similar to
the instant case, influenced the court concerning the fear of spurious
claims.76 In Naccash, the Virginia Supreme Court determined that the
policy of discouraging spurious claims was inappropriate in the context of
wrongful birth because no one would seriously contend that the emotional
distress of parents under such circumstances was feigned or fraudulent.'
The court reasoned that to require proof of physical injury accompanying
the emotional distress in such circumstances "would constitute a perversion of fundamental principles of justice."78
Another historical policy argument which supported the impact doctrine was the perceived difficulty in proving a causal connection between
the emotional trauma and the negligent act.79 However, causation problems are not peculiar to cases without impact. Causation is an ingredient
in all types of personal injury litigation, including cases in which there is

70. See Lloyd, 570 So. 2d at 988.
71. Kush, 616 So. 2d at 423-24.
72. See Stewart v. Gilliam, 271 So. 2d 466, 472 (4th DCA 1972), rev'd, 291 So. 2d 593 (Fla.
1974).
73. Id.
74. Id.at 477 (Reed, J., dissenting).
75. Cf id.at 474-77 (criticizing policies behind the impact doctrine as "outmoded").
76. See 290 S.E.2d 825 (Va. 1982). The instant court cited Naccash as a court which had adopted
broad guidelines to allow for the recovery of emotional damages. Kush, 616 So. 2d at 423. The instant
court did not, however, indicate whether it was guided principally by Naccash. Id.
77. Naccash, 290 S.E.2d at 831.
78. Id. (quoting Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8. 15 (N.J. 1979)).
79. Stewart, 271 So. 2d at 472.
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impact.' Moreover, courts have often stretched the impact doctrine by
finding that minor contacts constitute impacts, even though they played no
part in causing the real harm, and in themselves had no real importance.8 1
If juries can find causation between trivial impact and psychic damages,
they should be equally adept at finding causation where there is severe
emotional distress and no impact.
The Virginia Supreme Court, in Naccash, had little problem finding a
causal connection in the context of eugenic wrongful birth. 2 The court
awarded the parents emotional damages, notwithstanding the lack of physical impact, because the evidence displayed an unbroken chain of causal
connection.' The court found a direct link between the erroneous genetic
report, the deprivation of the parents' right to make an informed decision
regarding the continuation of the pregnancy, and the ensuing emotional
distress the parents suffered following the birth of their genetically defective child." The court found the causal link to be no less tenuous than
one where emotional distress is manifested by physical injury.85
A third historical policy argument which the instant court overcame
was that psychic damages cannot be adequately measured.86 The court
reasoned that ascertaining damages in the context of wrongful birth was
no more difficult than ascertaining damages in the emotional tort of defamation. Perhaps the court recognized that advancements in medical
diagnostic techniques, equipment, and professional understanding of psychic trauma have enabled the medical community to determine emotional
distress with objective evidence.88 Moreover, there is little justification in
refusing recovery because of a perceived inability to calculate damages,
when the courts have entrusted the medical profession with the responsibility of measuring psychic damages which arise from physical
impact, even where the impact is trivial.89
The final historical policy argument which has supported adherence to

80. Id. at 473.
81. See, e.g., Clark v. Choctawhatchee Elec. Coop., 107 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 1958) (finding impact
where plaintiff suffered a slight electric shock); Eagle-Picher Indus. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517 (3d DCA
1985) (finding embedded of asbestos fibers in the lungs to be an impact sufficient to warrant an award
of emotional damages for fear of contracting cancer), rev. denied, 492 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 1986);
KEaTON ET AL., supra note 15, § 54, at 363-64 ("Impact has meant a slight blow, a trifling burn or
electric shock, a trivial jolt or jar,... or the inhalation of smoke.").
82. Naccash, 290 S.E.2d at 825.
83. Id. at 831.
84. Id.
85. See id.

86. See Stewart 271 So. 2d at 472.
87. Kush, 616 So. 2d at 422.
88. See Niederman v. Brodsky, 261 A.2d 84, 86 (Pa. 1970).
89. Stewart, 271 So. 2d at 473.
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the impact doctrine is a fear of expansive litigation. 9 However, in those
jurisdictions which have allowed recovery in negligence for emotional
damages without physical impact, the flood of lawsuits simply has not
materialized." More significant than other states' experience is the basic
principle that a fear of expansive litigation should not deter courts from
granting relief in meritorious cases.92
In Champion, the court realized the artificiality of applying the impact
doctrine in all cases.9 In the instant case, the court extended the outer
limits of Champion by removing the requirement of a physical manifestation, at least in the context of wrongful birth. The court in both cases,
however, was reluctant to advocate total abrogation or replacement of the
impact doctrine.95 Although the historical policy arguments supporting
the impact doctrine often break down in individual cases, the Florida
Supreme Court seems unwilling to admit that the arguments have no validity.96 Perhaps the ultimate concern is that there is often tremendous diversity of sincere opinion in terms of severity of the trauma and causation,
despite medical science's progress in evaluating emotional trauma. The
physical harm requirement is merely one artificial means of separating
trivial or false claims from substantial, genuine injuries.98
The immediate impact of this ruling will be felt solely in the medical
community. 9 The long-term ramifications, however, could be much more
significant. Only time will tell whether the exception in the instant case is
an additional step toward full recovery for psychic trauma" or simply
another exception to the physical impact rule. Perhaps, as was suggested
0 ' the legislature should ultimately
one hundred years ago in Saunders,"
define the limits of recovery for emotional harm. 2 In the interim, the

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

See id. at 472.
Niederman, 261 A.2d at 89.
Stewart, 271 So. 2d at 475.
See Champion 478 So. 2d at 20.
See Kush, 616 So. 2d at 423.
Champion, 478 So. 2d at 20; see Kush, 616 So. 2d at 423.
Kush, 616 So. 2d at 423; see Champion, 478 So. 2d at 20.
Niederman, 261 A.2d at 92 (Bell, J., dissenting).
98. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 54, at 360-61.
99. See supra note 64.
100. See generally Peter A. Bell, The Bell Tolls: Toward Full Tort Recovery for Psychic Injury, 36
U. FLA. L. REV. 333 (1984) (discussing the possibility of full recovery for psychic trauma).
101. Saunders, 14 So. at 152.
102. Id. ("[This] presents a class of cases where legislative action fixing some standard of recovery
would be highly appropriate .... ); see Kush, 616 So. 2d at 425 (McDonald, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (recommending that the legislature examine the court's holding and correct it if
necessary).
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outer limit of exceptions to the impact doctrine in Florida will continue to
be defined by the judiciary on a case-by-case basis. 3

103. Champion, 478 So. 2d at 21-22 (Alderman, J., concurring specially).
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